On Saturday, 26 January 1879, a depressing scene was reported in the heart of Cape Town as the first news of the British military disaster at iSandlwana in Zululand on 22 January 1879 had been received in the ‘Old Colony’ by cable less than 24-hours earlier. Crowds of colonists and Imperial Military families gathered in St. George’s Street outside the offices of The Cape Argus in anticipation of news of a loved one or acquaintance who was serving with the army in Natal and Zululand. The press reported on the following Monday that ‘their sobs were calculated to unman the sternest soldier that ever met his death upon the field of battle.’ This desperate scene was the first of its kind that the residents of Cape Town had ever witnessed before and was akin to the shock that reverberated through the empire when the massacres of the Indian mutiny became known. This disaster was even more unbelievable, as only days previously, the Press’s spin-doctoring reported to the effect that a war with the AmaZulu was going to be brief and just. The reality was that the spin-doctoring was part of the psychological conditioning process in order to prepare the public for a war with the Zulu nation. Strategically, the conquest of the amaZulu was just another step towards the confederation of the South African territories, and the man charged with implementing this controversial policy was Sir Henry Bartle Frere, GCB GCSI, High Commissioner for South Africa.
Far from brief and just, this defeat, the greatest military disaster that had befell the British Army in recent years, was to have a substantial impact on the Cape Colony, not only financially, but would place immense strain on human, animal, military, and material resources. The remaining Imperial troops sitting back on the sidelines in the Cape would be immediately mobilized within days and dispatched to Natal, leaving the colonies with volunteers and permanent forces to take over garrison duties, not only in Cape Town but also on the fragile Eastern Cape Frontier. The calling-out of the volunteers had an adverse effect on the economy as these men were drawn away from their families, employees, farms, and businesses, much to their chagrin as it did when they were mobilized for the Ninth Eastern Cape Frontier War of 1877–78.
Not everyone in the colony was distressed by the news of the British defeat; the BaSotho looked upon it with interest, as did the aged but powerful BaPuthi Chief, Moorosi, who in 1879 was defiant against paying hut taxes, threatened by the prospect of disarmament, and was now invigorated with confidence brought on by the news. Moorosi, a cunning and defensive strategist, drew the Cape Government Forces into his country, and from March to November of 1879, from his mountain fortress, nestled against the Orange River in South-Eastern Basutoland, he repelled two attacks. It was only a third attack that brought the Cape Forces a victory and ended Moorosi’s reign.
By the close of 1879, the direct effects of the Anglo-Zulu War were clearly felt by the Old Colony as its economy suffered; it had been humiliated by the Moorosi rebellion as well as mourning the loss of human life against the Zulu and the BaPuthi. The cost to the Cape Government's war chest was severe, and the colony was depleted of horses and mules.
This chain of historical events—the Ninth Frontier War, the Anglo-Zulu War, the Moorosi Rebellion, and the Cape Government's insistence on implementing the Disarmament Act—would subsequently result in the Gun War of 1880–81 and bring further humiliation to the Cape Government, which resulted in relinquishing control of Basutoland to the Imperial Government.
Justifying the path to war: conditioning the public of the ‘Old Colony’
In January 1878, as the Ninth Eastern Cape Frontier War was being fought against the amaXhosa chiefdoms of the Gcaleka and Ngqika, Sir Bartle Frere was at his zenith in implementing his chartered mandate to confederate the South African territories. He was, however, being met with dogged resistance from the Prime Minister of the Cape, The Honorable Sir John Charles Molteno, and a passionate and arguably progressive minister, John Xavier Merriman. Molteno and Merriman fought the Confederation ferociously. They resented imperial meddling of any kind and felt that the Colonial Forces deployed at the front should not fall under imperial command. At loggerheads, Molteno insisted upon colonial independence and resigned in a fit of rage. He retracted his resignation and was then duly dismissed by Frere, who himself was showing signs of stress. Frere requested that Mr. John Gordon Sprigg assume the leadership of the Cape Government, and Sprigg, although formerly against federating the colonies, accepted the offer and provided the cooperation and support that Frere needed. The Frontier War was soon brought to a close under the command of the newly arrived Lieutenant General, the Honourable Sir Augustus Thesiger CB, who replaced Sir Arthur Thurlow Cunynghame as General Officer Commanding, Imperial Forces in South Africa. With adequate supporters around him in the Cape, Frere began to justify a case for using military force against the amaZulu in order to gain control of Zululand and move closer to confederation.
In order to condition the public to the notion of a war against the Zulus, the Cape Press was used as the mass media of its day. As the Ninth Eastern Cape Frontier War was being heavily reported in the press, periodical reports appeared in the Cape papers about the Zulus. Almost as a subliminal message, the theme was played out that a far greater threat awaited Southern Africa than dealing with the likes of Sandile and Kreli, but that of a 40,000-strong Zulu army under the leadership of King Cetshwayo kaMpande that was poised to raid Natal and the Transvaal. Throughout 1878 and in early 1879, Cape newspaper columns and editorial headings regularly read as follows: ‘The Zulus’, ‘the insolence of the Zulus appears to be increasing’, ‘The Zulu Difficulty’, ‘Boer’s laagering in fear of Zulu attack’ and ‘Slaughter in Zululand.’
With the press reporting more adverse news from Zululand than positive, the majority of colonists, regardless of their confederation views, were naturally supportive of the campaign, as it ensured their personal security. Many of the informed residents had seen through the charade, as did Mr. James Sivewright, Manager of the South African Telegraph Company. Sivewright was Scottish-born and had found himself based in King William’s Town during the frontier war, playing an important communications role and working closely with both the colonial government and Sir Bartle Frere’s staff. In late 1878, an energetic and intelligent man was requested by Frere to move from King William’s Town to Pietermaritzburg to ensure the smooth running of the Telegraphic Department. Sivewright was a close friend of the Merriman family and was privy to all the telegraphic communication in relation to the impending invasion of Zululand. His private views regarding Frere’s case for war with the Zulus were often expressed to the Merriman’s, and in a letter to Mrs. Merriman on 12 January 1879 (the day the action at Sirayo’s homestead was fought, not far from iSandlwana) Sivewright wrote, ‘Never let any of your friends put their children to be telegraph men. If they succeed in their profession, they will rise to positions in which they will know a deal more than enough to completely shake all their faith in human nature’.
With the drive to war gaining momentum, during the months of November and December 1878, the Cape Press openly reported that the imperial government was recruiting in the colony, of which there were two main efforts occurring: that of European officers and non-commissioned officers for the Natal Native Contingent (NNC), and a 100-man force being raised by the popular frontiersman, Commandant Frederick Xavier Schermbrucker, and former German Army officer, Captain Carl Immanuel Muller, from the German community residing in Kaffraria.
When the frontier war concluded, there was an abundance of colonial and foreign adventurers available who had experienced colonial warfare firsthand. While the campaign wasn’t a war of prolonged pitched battles, there were, however, frequent skirmishes, with the occasional battle against several thousand enemies. It was a campaign of arduous patrolling, coordinated drives, and the and the movement of large columns across vast tracts of land that required detailed coordination and logistical planning. If anything, despite the Molteno and Frere friction, both the imperial and colonial veterans had endured these drives in all weather conditions and were now well accustomed to campaign life. They developed an intimate understanding of each other’s capabilities that, by the close of the campaign, had honed their operational procedures, not to excellence but to a more acceptable standard than in early 1877; the frontier war could be viewed as a rehearsal for the Anglo-Zulu War.
General Thesiger had daily contact with the Cape Colonial officers during the campaign and had identified among them competent commanders that he mentioned in his dispatches of 26 June 1878; they were Commandants, F.X. Schermbrucker, Rupert Latrobe Lonsdale, William John Nettleton, Frank Newton Streatfield, and Wilhelm Carl Ferdinand von Linsingen.
In anticipation of war with the Zulus, these trusted commandants were put to work in November 1878, recruiting from the Eastern Cape the majority of the Europeans for the 2nd and 3rd Regiments of the NNC. Lonsdale, Nettleton, and von Linsingen actively secured from King William’s Town, Grahamstown, and the East London districts as many frontier war veterans that they could enroll; their muster roll contained a wonderful plethora of names synonymous with that campaign: James McTaggart, Herman August Johan Ludwig, Orlando Edward Murray, Charles Robert St. Leger Shervinton, and many more. Nettleton recorded in his notes from King William’s Town on 2 November 1878 annotations against candidates’ names that not only make for interesting reading but also reveal the process he went through during the NNC officer selection process: ‘D. Drummond wants better position than Lieut’, ‘W. Dick would only accept a Company’. He commented that both Drummond and Dick were regarded as being ‘desirable officers’ however, neither were subsequently appointed.
In November 1878, as the recruiting for the NNC in the Cape was ongoing, Albert Herbert Halder, a German civil engineer and former Bavarian Cavalry officer residing in Cape Town, corresponded with von Linsingen in relation to 66 veterans, described as ‘all good men’ that were ready to embark. All these men had claimed service in either the German Army or in the local Cape Volunteer regiments. Halder himself was appointed a lieutenant in the 1/2nd NNC, and it can be assumed that some of his men also joined the 2nd NNC as non-commissioned officers.
In early November 1878, Commandant F.X. Shermbrucker and Captain C.I. Muller started recruiting a 100-man unit that was named in the press as the Kaffrarian Vanguard. Three weeks after recruiting began, The Cape Mercury proudly reported that the vanguard’s ranks were full, and the men had signed on for six months of service. Of the 100 all-ranks, 38 were English, and the remainder were either German or Danes, with no fewer than 12 reputed to be holders of the Franco-German war medal.
In Cape Town, at the Grand Parade on Saturday, 11 January 1879, the very day that Frere’s ultimatum to the Zulus expired and Lord Chelmsford’s army invaded Zululand, a general military review was being held. The Prime Minister, J.G. Sprigg, the Colonial Secretary, and Lieutenant Colonel Edward Yewd Brabant reviewed three volunteer regiments, and when addressing the troops, Sprigg thanked them for their good response during the frontier war but very deliberately reminded them that under the revised Volunteer Act of 1878, they could be placed at the disposal of the government at any time to serve both within the colony and beyond its borders. Sprigg concluded by stating, ‘I do not make these remarks from a fear that there would be any hesitation on your part in responding if called upon’. The Cape Volunteers had been placed on notice; they may soon be called upon to mobilize for active service once more.
Post iSandlwana: The Initial Impact on the Colony
When Frere’s ultimatum to the Zulus expired, Lord Chelmsford invaded Zululand with five separate columns, of which Cape-born or former Cape residents were serving in each. During No. 3 (Central) Columns first engagement at Sirayo’s homestead on 12 January, two former members of the Cape’s Frontier Armed and Mounted Police were both wounded during the attack and thus became the first European casualties of the war. They were 37-year-old Scottish-born Lieutenant Thomas ‘Tom’ Purvis and 20-year-old Irish-born Corporal Jesse Handcock Mayor, both of the 1/3 NNC. Both Purvis and Mayor were evacuated to the Rorke’s Drift mission station (converted into a commissariat store and military hospital) near the Buffalo River, where Mayor was to find himself amidst the severe fighting at the hospital on the night on 22/23 January. On the 22 January, No. 3 Column, following the superficial success at Sirayo’s homestead ten days earlier, fought a defensive action at the column's camp beneath the iSandlwana feature. Some 15,000 Zulus routed the British camp and inflicted approximately 1,300 casualties, of which many Cape men serving in the NNC perished; only a few managed to escape back across the Buffalo River to Natal.
On 25 January, three days after the iSandlwana disaster, the almost unbelievable news was received in Cape Town by Telegraph. The following day, St. George’s Street was inundated with Cape Colonists crowding the Cape Argus office, desperate to obtain more details of relatives or friends, and a shroud of depression and anxiety was cast over the cape. It was only until the 28th that the officers’ names were released.
The same day the officer casualties were published, the remaining 3 companies of the 2nd Battalion, 4th (The King’s Own Royal Regiment) Foot posted to Cape Town were mobilized for immediate embarkation to Natal in order to rejoin the remainder of their regiment. These men, high in emotions, made some patriotic passing comments to the press: ‘If I do get killed, said an intelligent soldier to us, I’ll render an account of a few Zulu’s first, and I’ll not be satisfied with merely striking them; I’ll kill them’. Mr. John X. Merriman who first learnt of the disaster on the 24th, (Presumably from Sivewright in the telegraph office) recorded in his diary for several days the shock that was felt in the Cape and on the 26th wrote: ‘Excitement and gloom still continues. No fresh news’.
Chief Justice Sir John Henry De Villiers presided over a meeting at the Cape Town Commercial Exchange on 29 January along with a respected cross-section of Cape politicians, clergymen, businessmen, and volunteer soldiers. The purpose was to conduct a meeting where the town’s residents could express their opinions of the iSandlwana disaster before the Mail Steamer left for England. As the meeting concluded, it was decided that firstly, sympathy must be extended to Natal amid cheers of hear, hear! Secondly, volunteers should come forward, as Natal offered assistance to the Cape during the recent frontier war. Major Richard Southey, CMG, a supporter of imperial expansion, was applauded for already offering to raise volunteers for Natal. Lastly, it was suggested that a War Relief Fund Committee should be formed, of which £2500 was also immediately pledged—£500 from one citizen alone.
As the imperial forces in the colony departed for Natal, the Cape volunteers were mobilized for ‘Active Service’ in as much as to assume the garrison duties of the colony, including those of the Eastern Frontier. The Duke of Edinburgh’s Own Volunteer Rifles (The Dukes) had already taken on some minor garrison duties as early as 9 November 1878, when 5 companies of the 2/4th Foot embarked for Natal, their area of responsibility being the provision of guard detachments at the government house, main barracks, the castle, the military hospital, and the Amsterdam Battery. The dukes, being an infantry regiment, were relieved of this duty by Prince Alfred’s Own Cape Field Artillery, as Major R. Southey was ordered to mobilize from the 8 companies of the dukes a composite force for immediate deployment to the frontier aboard the Couland. On 1 February, 7 officers, 16 non-commissioned officers, and 200 privates marched through Cape Town and embarked for the Transkei, where they were destined to garrison Ibeka, Butterworth, and Malans Mission near Fort Bowker. They were under the command of Captain Edward James Whindus, a powerfully built and jovial former colour sergeant of the 86th (Royal County Down) Regiment who recorded their mission, ‘To relieve Imperial Forces so as to allow of their being despatched to Zululand, on the receipt of news of Isandhlwana’.
From Port Elizabeth, in what was known as the ‘Third Active Service’ Detachment, the Prince Alfred’s Volunteer Guard (PAVG) mobilized 3 officers, 6 non-commissioned officers, and 65 privates for garrison duties in King William’s Town in order to relieve the 88th (Connaught Rangers) Regiment, which was destined to serve from 28 January to 28 April 1879. The PAVG received 25 immediate volunteers, with the remaining 75 being selected by ballot; however, only 64 turned out for embarkation, as many felt the ballot system was unfair, and the press speculated that force may need to be used but hoped this wasn’t the case. The full 100-man quota was eventually reached, and the Eastern Province Herald proudly named every man that had been deployed on active service. Apart from this detachment of the PAVG, some 15 individual members of the regiment are recorded to have taken leave and served with the army in Zululand; one-man, Private Gordon Clarke Sidney Christian, was reported killed at iSandlwana while serving with the Natal Carbineers. Christian had served in the frontier war with both the PAVG and Baker’s Horse.
The government of the Old Colony gladly accepted and took on the routine garrison duties; however, this was the minimum requirement to ensure the security of the colony. News was spreading among the amaXhosa and BaSotho that the British had been defeated and the Transvaal Boers were defiant about their annexation in 1877; it was believed that the eastern frontier could once again be destabilized. Steps needed to be taken to ensure that the disaster of iSandlwana did not ignite a general rebellion, and on 31 January, the Commandant General issued orders for 1,000 of the Cape Mounted Rifles (CMR), volunteers, and the newly raised Cape Mounted Yeomanry to be posted to key locations along the frontier.
The Colonial Governments response was not only commendable, but it proved that the volunteers could be relied upon to mobilize at short notice, albeit not to full strength. It must be reiterated that the volunteers held down day jobs, worked farms, and filled critical government positions; they, for the most part, responded both in body and spirit to the Natal disaster. There were isolated cases where men refused to leave their businesses, as was the case of the PAVG ballot system debacle; there were also other knock-on effects when mobilizing volunteers. The Civil Commissioner for Port Elizabeth, having let one of his clerks, Private J.G. Blanckenburg, proceed on service with the PAVG, needed to backfill the vacancy and applied to his superior in Cape Town for permission to appoint a temporary clerk. The Commissioner even went as far as to request that Blanckenburg could draw his full salary while on active service—clearly a case of double-dipping and at additional cost to the government.
The Cape public opinion and general support for the war remained constant during the months of January and February, and in March, the Colonial Secretary received a formal letter from Commandant Louis Henri Meurant of Riversdale stating that during a town meeting, a resolution was passed ‘expressing sympathy and approval with measures of Sir Bartle Frere in Zululand’.
Recruitment in the Cape
Immediately after iSandlwana, Lord Chelmsford and his staff reassessed the magnitude of the recent loss and leapt into the process of defending Natal’s border and cities before a second invasion could be contemplated. Colonel Charles Knight Pearson’s No. 1 (Coastal) Column had been engaged with the Zulus at Nyezane on 22 January and was locked into a state of siege at the Eshowe mission station. Cape colonials could be found serving with the 2nd NNC under Pearson, several of whom were casualties at Nyezane; some even with German sounding names and possibly former members of Halder’s Cape Town contingent.
Mounted reinforcements were urgently required, and the commissariat department was also desperately short of transport conductors. Chelmsford turned to recruiting in the Cape Colony, where there was a larger population to draw from: 250,000 white residents in the Cape, 20,000 in Natal, 50,000 in the Transvaal (most Afrikaners wouldn’t join the British due to the Transvaal being annexed in 1877), and 15,000 in Griqualand West, mostly on the Kimberley diamond fields.
Recruitment in the Cape can be broken down into four distinct groups: reinforcement drafts for the Frontier Light Horse (FLH), recruiting for Bakers Horse in Port Elizabeth, recruiting for Lonsdale’s Mounted Rifles (LMR) in Cape Town, and enrolling transport conductors for the Commissariat Department. Parallel to this, recruiting for the FLH, Raaff’s Rangers, and the Commissariat was also occurring at the Kimberley Goldfields of Griqualand West as well as in Natal, although fewer numbers were achieved in these areas compared with the Cape.
The FLH was an irregular regiment, originally raised by the Imperial Government in the Eastern Cape in December 1877 for the Ninth Frontier War. By February 1879, the FLH ranks were swelling with many ‘time expired’ men who had served out their six-month contract. These ‘time expired’ men had endured the Ninth Frontier War, were forced to march 450 miles north into the Transvaal to campaign against the Bapedi King, Sekhukhune, and were now part of Colonel Evelyn Wood’s No. 4 Column at Utrecht, from where they undertook patrol work against the Zulus. Most were tired of campaigning and wished to return home; some were possibly shaken by the recent disaster at iSandlwana. On 26 February, some 26 of these ‘Time expired’ FLH veterans arrived in Port Elizabeth from Durban aboard the transport Venice bringing with them many spoils of war such as Assegai’s, Shields and curio’s, but more importantly to them, they had received their share of the ‘Cattle prize money’ that was a key motivator in recruiting irregular troops in South Africa at the time. As the FLH was already operational, Chelmsford turned to the tried and tested recruiting grounds of the Wodehouse and Port Elizabeth districts of the Eastern Cape to recruit replacement drafts and bring the FLH up to strength (200 Strong). Previously, in December 1878, Chelmsford had successfully brought the ranks of the FLH up to strength from these districts.
The reality was that recruiting for the FLH in the Cape was going to be a repetitive process until the end of the war, as every month, more men became ‘time expired’ and needed replacing. In the Wodehouse district, 40 FLH recruits were secured from the hamlet of Dordrecht and arrived in Natal on 1 February under the command of Captain Archibald McNeil. When the Dordrecht draft arrived in Pietermaritzburg, they rightfully anticipated that they would proceed immediately to join Wood’s Column at Utrecht, but they were detained in Pietermaritzburg, of which Chelmsford wrote to Wood on 13 February,
‘Dear Wood, I was much disgusted to find upon Telegram received yesterday from Bellairs that the 40 Dordrecht men intended for Buller has been detained for the defence! Of PM Burg – I sent back a strong remonstration & I trust that they will be at once sent to you. I have done all I could to strengthen your force, and it is amusing to find my efforts thwarted’.
Several months later, when ‘C’ (Dordrecht) Troop of the 2nd CMY was being mobilized for active service in Moorosi’s country, at least four men were reported absent from service in Zululand with the FLH.
In May, Lieutenant Charles Everitt of the FLH returned to the Eastern Cape to recruit additional drafts for the once-depleted regiment following the two engagements at Hlobane on 28 March and Khambula 29 March where the FLH sustained heavy losses. By the end of May, Everitt had secured 80 recruits from Port Eizabeth and Grahamstown. A second draft was recruited in June, and under the command of Sergeant Arthur Kilwarden Wolfe, they fought against the Port Elizabeth Surf as their boat crashed through the waves to get out to the Olympus, a task that was only made more difficult as some of the men had been drinking. Wolfe was a serving member of the PAVG and brought along with him seven other members of the PAVG for service in the FLH.
At the conclusion of the Ninth Frontier War, Baker’s Horse, an imperial-raised regiment, recruited and equipped in Port Elizabeth in May 1878, found itself by November of the same year posted to Kokstad, where it remained idle and awaiting further orders. On 12 December, they arrived in Pietermaritzburg from Kokstad, having been ordered to disband as they weren’t required for operations in Zululand. Of the 106 in all ranks, 28 were transferred to the FLH or the NNC, with the remaining 78 being shipped by steamer back to Port Elizabeth for discharge. The regiment’s horses were put to auction at Fort Napier by J. Raw & Co. of Pietermaritzburg. No sooner than Captain Francis James Baker had broken up his regiment and was back in Port Elizabeth, Lord Chelmsford was in telegraphic contact with him about Baker’s recent offer to raise 200 mounted volunteers for service in Zululand. On 29 January, when corresponding with Colonel Wood, Chelmsford recorded his intention to accept Baker’s offer. The following week, Baker placed an advertisement for,
‘Bakers Horse’ in the Eastern Province Herald stating: ‘TROOPERS WANTED’ and requesting 250 men for service under the Imperial Government at a rate of Five-shillings per diem. The same newspaper recorded optimistically about Bakers new regiment: ‘We have no doubt he will easily raise the required number’.
By 11 February, 50 recruits had already sailed for Natal, of which the local press recorded that their ‘bilious-cord’ uniforms didn’t look serviceable, and they should be called ‘Baker’s Canaries’. When a second detachment of 59 recruits sailed aboard the African six days later, they were described as ‘a very serviceable lot of young fellows’ although they objected to being called Canaries.
Baker appointed Captain William Whalley, late of the FLH, as adjutant of Baker’s Horse and entrusted Whalley to conclude the recruiting while Baker himself sailed for Natal. On 26 February, Whalley was recruiting for junior non-commissioned officers, which he successfully obtained by March 11. During Whalley’s recruiting drive, he briefly operated from the White Horse Hotel in Grahamstown, of which the Eastern Star recorded that although he was a former storekeeper of Grahamstown for many years, the post-nominal abbreviation of ‘VC’ affixed to his name was a mystery to the residents and generated a lot of interest. Regardless, Baker’s Horse was now at its established strength, and Whalley joined the remainder of the regiment in Natal. Elements of Baker’s Horse would soon be in action at Hlobane Mountain on 28 March alongside the FLH.
Commandant Rupert Lonsdale’s 3rd Regiment, NNC, had been severely mauled at iSandlwana and was soon after disbanded while the white officers and non-commissioned officers were made available for mounted patrol work. Chelmsford, having decided that additional mounted troops were required, ordered Lonsdale to Cape Town to recruit for a new regiment to be referred to as Lonsdale’s Mounted Rifles. On 1 March, Lonsdale arrived in Cape Town aboard the Venice along with Commandant George Hamilton ‘Maori’ Browne and Captain’s G.R. Massey-Hicks, Robert William Develing, Robert Duncombe and Daniel Joseph Hayes, all formerly of the 3rd NNC.
In Cape Town, Lonsdale and his staff based themselves at the Cape Castle, from where they planned a recruiting drive through fourteen towns that would last from 4-28 March. The aim of the drive was to recruit about 450 whites and approximately 360 coloured men. Browne was tasked with liaising with the respective district’s civil commissioners about recruiting the coloured recruits. Captain Rober William Stapleton Burnet also joined the recruiting staff about this time as Lonsdale was securing a suitable transit camp in Papendorp (now Woodstock) from where recruits could be processed prior to embarking for Durban. Burnet was soon to be actively recruiting around Swellendam and Mossel Bay.
By 14 March, under the command of Captain Allan Gordon, late 3rd NNC, the first detachment (’A’ Troop) sailed from Cape Town aboard the Roman amid patriotic cheers from a crowd gathered on the docks. Once in Durban, the Cape recruits would undergo training and be fitted out with horses and saddlery.
Detachments of recruits embarked periodically, and Captain Duncombe was recorded to have arrived in Durban on 22 April aboard the Olympus with a contingent of 180-men along with some 40 horses. The Olympus once again on 3 May transported drafts for LMR, including Commandant Lonsdale himself, five officers, and 183 men, again to a cheering crowd.
Not all of the LMR’s farewells went smoothly, as Captain Massey-Hicks was to discover on 2 May, as he was trying to embark men aboard the Minora from the Cape Town docks. The Water Police and the Master of Arms for the Royal Navy’s, HMS Active and Flora were searching for deserters and arrived at the Minora presenting a warrant for the arrest of Trooper John Thomas; an alleged deserter from the Navy. Massey-Hicks tore the warrant up and was soon arrested and charged with ‘unlawful interference’ and remanded after the first hearing.
A lesser-known chapter of the Cape recruiting story is the recruiting of transport conductors and wagon drivers for the overstretched commissariat department in Natal. While large quantities of mules and horses were being purchased in both the Cape and Griqualand West, Lieutenant Frank Williams of the Transport Service, formerly of Hanover, Cape Colony, was in that town recruiting mule and wagon drivers when locals declared that they weren’t happy with having their domestic staff poached and went as far as to cite the ‘Master and Servants Act’ that prohibited the enlistment of employers for anything but the regular army.
While Lonsdale's recruiting in the Cape’s Western districts was a success, a review of the volunteers' monthly attendance ledgers at the time reveals that many volunteers were reluctant to come forward. In the case of Prince Alfred’s Own Cape Volunteer Artillery, of a total of 129 all-ranks on strength during the month of April, only 4 were recorded as ‘Resigned—joined Lonsdale’s contingent’. A correspondent of The Standard Mail observed that many of the recruits for the LMR were mere boys in appearance, and went on to add that it was a well-known fact, especially in the American Civil War, ‘that the martial spirit is stronger in boys from 12 to 21 than at any other period’. Very soon, the cape volunteers and burghers would be called out for service against Chief Moorosi in Basutoland.
Moorosi’s BaPuthi rebellion
Chief Moorosi of the BaPuthi was aged 84 years in 1879 and was a very influential and intelligent leader who resided in the Quthing district of Basutoland, where he’d built for over 20 years an almost impregnable terraced fortress (400 meters in height and inaccessible from three sides due to precipitous cliffs), from which he had a freshwater catchment and kraals for his cattle. In 1877, the Colonial Government realized that Moorosi was a threat and needed to be brought under the government’s control. They first placed a Resident Magistrate in his territory, of which there were two Resident Magistrates appointed in quick succession; both were determined to stamp their authority, which resulted in one of Moorosi’s favorite sons (Doda) being arrested and charged with horse stealing. Doda was sprung from prison on 31 December 1878, and fled to the safety of Moorosi’s mountain, leaving the government embarrassed over the escape. They insisted that Moorosi return Doda to the magistrate, but he wasn’t prepared to do this and denied Doda’s presence on the mountain. Worse still for Moorosi was the inconceivable announcement by the government the previous year that the BaSotho, including the BaPuthi, would be called upon to surrender their arms as part of the government's disarmament policy.
On 22 January 1879, the very day that No. 3 Column was in battle at iSandlwana, the Government Agent of Basutoland, Colonel Charles Duncan Griffith CMG, reported that ‘I am happy to say that there is no excitement in the district generally’ however, within days as reports of the iSandlwana defeat reached the Eastern frontier, there was great alarm among the colonists and anxiety set in. On 22 February, the Resident Magistrate and interface with Moorosi, Mr. John Austen from his Quthing Magisterial office, started to receive seditious reports from Moorosi’s mountain that he passed onto the government: ‘These reports have been encouraged by the sad Natal disaster. Mahhube having told the sons and people of Morosi, (sic) that we have been beaten at Natal, Griqualand West, and Sekukui’s (sic), and the Boers in the Transvaal were also rebelling, and that the government is quite powerless.’ Austen, in fear of being attacked at Quthing, fled to the protection of Palmeitfontein on 23 February and within days, Moorosi was in rebellion, having sacked Austen’s magisterial offices. Sir Bartle Frere, through the Secretary of Native Affairs, wisely advised the Cape government to leave the ‘Doda affair’ alone until ‘the Zulu matter is near settlement'; however, the Sprigg government, in order to save face among the BaSotho and amaXhosa, supported by the advice of Colonel Griffith, decided that Moorosi could be dealt with now.
The CMR and elements of the CMY were initially mobilized for operations against the BaPuthi, but without imperial support. Griffith himself took command of the force and moved into Moorosi’s territory, fought some initial skirmishes before arriving at Moorosi’s mountain, where the cunning old chief had 300 well-armed and supplied men manning the terraced fortress.
Colonel Griffith attempted the first assault on 11 April with two troops of the CMR and three troops of the CMY, and when attempting to clear the first row of the schanze's (stone wall), they came under a very accurate fire that forced the stormers to take cover. Griffith’s force could advance no further without sustaining severe losses and was forced to retire; they suffered 27 casualties, including 4 killed. On 30 May, Griffith was replaced by Colonel Brabant, a former imperial officer, now a local farmer and commander of the 2nd Regiment CMY. Brabant attempted another assault on 5 June with elements of the CMR, 1st CMY, 2nd CMY, 3rd CMY, burghers, and loyal BaSotho, but this attack was also met with a withering fire and repulsed. Brabant was to write years later that he was grievously disappointed at the failure of the attack and believed that only regulars could succeed. In his confidential reports to the government, he aired the real dirty laundry: desertions in the CMR and an officer refusing to obey orders in action.
Colonel Zachary Stanley Bayly, also a former British officer, replaced the exhausted Brabant and, following a detailed reconnaissance of the three impassable aspects of the mountain, decided to assault it at night by using purpose-built scaling ladders. Moorosi’s defenders had also dwindled to less than 100 men.
On the night of 19 November, following a three-day bombardment, Bayly’s assaulting force, consisting of 300 CMR, 40 Wodehouse Border Guard, and 460 Native Levies (Mfengu, Tambookies, and BaSotho), scaled the precipitous cliffs, entered the stronghold, and routed the defenders. ‘Zac’ Bayly’s well-executed attack had succeeded and thus restored the government’s prestige. Moorosi was killed during the final stages of the fight, but Doda escaped and was never apprehended.
The colonial government could only enjoy a brief period of rest from regional conflict, as the BaSotho were not going to submit to the government’s determination to disarm them. The BaSotho had watched how Moorosi’s 300 BaPuthi had kept the government forces pinned down for months, and they knew from Zululand that the British could also be defeated.
Conclusion
At the close of 1879, both the Anglo-Zulu War and Moorosi’s rebellion were over, and the volunteers returned to their homes. The Cape Government, in order to secure the frontier, had spent some £438,000 on defence alone. The Moorosi rebellion had proven to be exceedingly expensive, and only halfway through June, £98,000 had already been expended. The Cape Treasurer in the House of Assembly stated in July 1879 that although the colonies revenue had increased,
‘Our good fortune, however, has been overshadowed by a continued necessity for war expenses, arising from the disturbances in some portions of our borders, as well as by the anxiety which the Zulu trouble have occasioned’.
The individual volunteers who fought in the Moorosi campaign were partly drawn from the CMY, and as the campaign dragged on, they personally felt the impact as their lives remained threatened. One yeoman expressed his views: ‘We have now been out here three months, and during this time our farms, businesses, and homes have been suffering.’
Although there had been considerable tension between the Cape Government and Moorosi for years, Moorosi was a man pushed into a corner, and the Zulu victory at iSandlwana gave him the confidence to make a stand and rebel. The BaSotho, many of whom fought with the government against Moorosi in 1879, also realized that if they needed to fight over the disarmament policy, they would have the upper hand as they were the masters of their territory, as no one knew it better than they. The colonial government proceeded with the disarmament of the region, and the BaSotho went into rebellion in what was known as the Gun War of 1880–81, which eventually resulted in the Colonial Government relinquishing Basutoland to the Imperial Government, which in turn led to the modern-day Lesotho, which is surrounded on all sides by South Africa.
As the plans for confederation faded, Sir Bartle Frere was eventually recalled to England, but he remained loyal to those who supported him during the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. He wrote to the Secretary of State in England on 29 December 1879 commending Prime Minister J.G. Sprigg. Sprigg was mentioned for his work during the frontier war and ‘in sending aid for the prosecution of the war in Zululand, or the active practical measures they have taken and are taking for perfecting a system of efficient self-defence for this colony’; nothing was mentioned about the Moorosi rebellion saga.
The Old Colony was well represented in Natal and Zululand during the war, as hundreds of colonists and former residents served in the ranks of the FLH, LMR, NNC, and Baker’s Horse; some had become casualties or gained distinction and notoriety. For the first time in the history of the history of the colonies, as the imperial regiments left for Natal, it was solely responsible for its own internal security. Although a welcomed responsibility, it did place immense strain on the permanent CMR and volunteers to ensure the frontier remained secure. While the colonial military mobilizations had stretched both the capabilities and capacity of military units, it helped the colonial forces adapt and develop a military system that, by the time of the Second Anglo-Boer War of 1899–1902, gave them the framework for a military force that could easily adapt to defend the colony. It was through these times and the adversity of the Anglo-Zulu War that the colonial military system served its apprenticeship and grew.
There was an abundance of redundant former soldiers in the colony following the Anglo-Zulu War, many of whom had served with the FLH, Baker’s Horse, and the imperial forces. Many of these men applied to join the permanent establishments of the CMR and Cape Police, with some applying much later in 1883 to join the permanent Cape Infantry Regiment. In September 1879, Frere suggested to Chelmsford’s replacement, General Sir Garnet Wolseley, that soldiers not gainfully employed should be used to assist in bringing in the Cape harvest; Wolseley agreed as long as they weren’t required for duty.
Arguably, if it weren’t for the retention of these men within the Cape Forces during the 1880s, the outcome of the Second Anglo-Boer War may have been very different, as their experience was of immense value. One of these men, a young Henry Timson Lukin, recently wounded at Ulundi 4 July 1879 while serving with the NNC, succeeded in gaining a subaltern’s commission in the CMR. He remained with the Cape Military Forces, fought in the Anglo-Boer War, and subsequently commanded the South African Brigade on the Somme in 1916 and the 9th Division between 1916 and 18. Had it not been for the Anglo-Zulu War, Lukin probably wouldn’t have sailed to South Africa, and his leadership qualities were never revealed in a military setting.
A most interesting conclusion to the Anglo-Zulu War was that the king of the Zulus, Cetshwayo kaMpande, was destined to be exiled to Cape Town. He was first housed at the Cape Castle and then in an open-arrest arrangement on the farm Oude Molen on the banks of the Black River in 1881. During his time at Oude Molen, Cetshwayo was often seen walking through the surrounding districts with his guards and regularly receiving visitors, including royalty, with Table Mountain as the backdrop.
References:
I. Unpublished sources
A. Cape Archives Repository, Cape Town
1. Auditor’s Generals Department (AD)
AD 1-50: Monthly accounts; 1st Cape Mounted Yeomanry, 1879.
2. Brabant Papers, ACC459: Unpublished autobiography c1906.
3. Colonial Office Papers (CO)
CO 3306: Correspondence of the Cape Commissioners (Port Elizabeth) 1879.
CO 4206 (R16): Correspondence from the inhabitants of Riversdale 1879.
CO 4205 (L9): Correspondence in relation to Lonsdale’s Mounted Rifles recruiting campaign in the Cape Colony.
4. Defence Department (DD)
DD 1-6: Correspondence, Colonial Military Secretary 1878-1879.
DD 1-11: Correspondence, Prince Alfred’s Own Cape Volunteer Artillery 1878-1879.
DD 1-279: Cape Officers 1879-1881.
DD 1-272: Correspondence, Commandant General, Kafir & Zulu Wars 1878-1879.
DD 1-275: Papers regarding the 1878-1881 Wars.
5. Government House Papers (GH)
GH 23/36 (405): Frere to Secretary of State in relation to men who assisted the imperial government in restoring order to the Dominions, 1879.
GH 36/1 (32): Military Secretaries correspondence, 1879.
GH 37/5: Military Secretaries correspondence, 1879.
B. Pietermaritzburg Archives Repository
Wood Papers, ACC598, II/2/2: incoming letter 1878-9.
C. National Archives, United Kingdom
WO100 49: South African General Service Medal Roll, Colonials 1877-79.
WO100 50: South African General Service Medal Roll, Colonials 1877-79.
II. Official Publications
A. British Parliamentary Papers (BPP) (Housed in Cape Archives Repository)
C.2144: Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of South Africa, August, 1878.
C.2234: Correspondence Relative to Military Affairs in Natal and the Transvaal, February 1879.
C3280: Contributions to be made by the Colonies of the Cape and Natal towards the costs of the Transkei and Zulu Wars respectively, July 1882.
B. Cape Colonial Publications (CCP) (Housed in Cape Archives Repository)
CCP A17-79: Correspondence and papers (in part) respecting the rebellion in British Basutoland, (Cape of Good Hope Government, Cape Town,1879).
CCP A27-79: Total Amount brought to Charge on War Account in consequence of the Disturbances on the Northern Border and the Moorosi Campaign, (Cape of Good Hope Government, Cape Town, 1879).
CCP A49-79: Copies of correspondence, telegrams and etc. in re. Morosi’s Rebellion, Basutoland, (Cape of Good Hope Government, Cape Town,
1879).
CCP 11/1/1: Cape of Good Hope, List of Voters, 1873 & 1879, Saul Solomon & Co, Cape Town, 1873 & 1879.
III. Other Published Documents
Intelligence Branch, Narrative of the Field Operations Connected with the Zulu War of 1879, Horse Guards, 1881
Laband, John.P.C., Lord Chelmsford’s Zululand Campaign 1878-1879, Army Records Society, 1994.
Maclean, Colonel., Compendium of Kafir Laws & Customs, J. Slater: Grahamstown, 1906.
Merriman, J.X., Selections from the correspondence of J.X. Merriman, The Van Riebeek Society, Cape Town, 1960.
Omer-Cooper J.D., The Zulu Aftermath, A Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Bantu Africa, Longman: London, 1966.
Smith, Keith I., Local General Orders Relating to the Anglo-Zulu War 1879, D.P. & G Military Publishers, Doncaster, 2005.
Smith, Keith I., Select Documents: A Zulu War Sourcebook, D.P. & G Military Publishers, Doncaster, 2006.
IV: Newspapers and Periodicals
South African Library, Cape Town
Eastern Star, Grahamstown, 1878-9 (MP1050)
Natal Witness, Pietermaritzburg 1878-9 (MP1222)
The Cape Hornet, Cape Town, 1879 (MP1136)
The Cape Mercury, King William’s Town, 1878 (MP1210)
The Diamond News, Kimberley, 1879 (MP1053)
The Eastern Province Herald, Port Elizabeth, 1878-9 (MP1034)
The Standard Mail, Cape Town, 1879 (MP1119)
V: Books and Compilations
Castle, Ian & Knight, Ian., Fearful Hard Times, The Siege and Relief of Eshowe, 1879, Greenhill Books, 1994.
Gon, Philip., The Road to Isandhlwana: The Years of an Imperial Battalion, A.D. Donker: London, 1979.
Greaves, Adrian., Crossing the buffalo, the Zulu war of 1879, Cassell, 2005.
Greaves, Adrian., Isandlwana, How the Zulus Humbled the British Empire, Pen & Sword: Great Britain, 2011.
Hall, Richard. T., Prince Alfred’s Guard; Its history, Port Elizabeth 1906.
Hamilton-Browne, Colonel G., A Lost Legionary in South Africa, T. Werner Laurie: London 1912.
Hislop, Jim., Wheatfields & Windmills, The old homesteads and farms of Observatory, Craft Print, Singapore, 2014.
Johnston R.E., Ulundi to Delville Wood, Maskew Miller, Ltd, Cape Town.
Jones, H.M., The Boiling Cauldron, Utrecht District and the Anglo-Zulu War, 1879, The Shermershill Press, Bisley, Gloucestershire, 2006.
Kotze, Sir John., Biographical Memoirs and Reminiscences, Maskew Miller, Ltd, Cape Town.
Laband, John., Zulu Warriors, The Battle for the South African Frontier, Yale University Press, 2014.
Knight, Ian., Zulu Rising, The epic story of Isandlwana and Rorke’s Drift, Macmillan 2010.
Norris-Newman, Charles. L., In Zululand with the British Throughout the War of 1879 (W.H. Allen & Co 1880)
Orpen, Neil., The Dukes, A History of the Cape Town Rifles ‘Dukes’, Cape Town Creda Press, 1984.
Sanders, Peter., Throwing down the white man, Morija Museum & Archives, 2010.
Sole, Terry., For God, Queen and Colony; The Colonial Volunteer and Native Regiments in the Zulu War 1879, Token publishing, 2011.
Streatfield, Frank N, CMG., Reminiscences of an old ‘un, Everleigh Nash, London, 1911.
Tylden, Major G., The Armed Forces of South Africa, Trophy Press: Johannesburg, 1982.
Wilmot. A., The History of Our Times in South Africa, Volume 1, 1872-1879, (J.C. Juta & Co, London 1897).
VI: Pamphlets, Thesis, Articles and Other Papers
Hulme, J.J., Morosi’s Mountain 1879, A Royal Engineer’s Report, South African Military History Journal, Volume 8, Number 3.
Epic Cam.