Addison’s Flying Column in Zululand
The story of the Colonial Scouts secret mission in Zululand, 1900
Lieutenant Colonel Friend Addison MLA who commanded the Colonial Scouts in Zululand during 1900 (The Official Natal Mounted Rifles History)
In early 1900, as part of General Redvers Buller's plan to break through the Boer defences and relieve Ladysmith, he sent Colonel Friend Addison and his Colonial Scouts deep into neutral Zululand with the mission to relieve pressure from his main attack by forcing the Boers out of Helpmekaar and, secondly, to blow up the Waschbank Bridge. This was the way that Buller operated during the Zulu War as a raiding master.
On 3rd January 1900, three of the five independent squadrons of the Colonial Scouts were united on paper as a regiment, and nine days later they mustered for the first time as a regiment and elected Lieutenant Colonel Friend Addison MLA, as Chief Leader of the regiment. Addison was 51 years old when he assumed command of the Colonial Scouts. A long-standing member of the Natal Volunteer Movement since 1869, Addison had commanded the Natal Guides during the Anglo-Zulu War in 1879 and was present at the actions of Nyezane and Gingindhlovu, being Mentioned-in-Despatches for his campaign work. In 1887, he took over command of the Victoria Mounted Rifles and was promoted Lieutenant Colonel the following year. He was a sugar planter by profession and a one-time MLA, while his twenty-year-old son, Patrick Addison, was besieged in Ladysmith with the Natal Mounted Rifles. Since 16th September 1899, Addison had been serving as the second-in-command of Bethune’s Mounted Infantry and was thus well conversant with the country and the current strategy of the war.
On 4th January 1900, Addison attended a conference with Buller, who ordered him to take three hundred Colonial Scouts, attack the Boers at Helpmekaar, and, if at all possible, attempt to blow up the Waschbank Bridge. Buller, some twenty years earlier during the Zulu War, had become well-known for his raiding and long-distance patrolling and was thus very aware, probably more so than any other senior British officer in Natal, of the nature of the operations that he was ordering Addison to undertake. Addison would not only be isolated, but would also need to operate on a light scale, surviving on what food, water, ammunition, and medical equipment they could personally carry.
Buller ordered Addison to depart from Estcourt on 16 January, the same time that Buller’s Army would depart Frere to launch another assault against the Boers on Thukela Heights. Addison was Buller’s extreme right-of-line and was to be positioned ready to launch his attack on the 22nd, at which time Buller optimistically expected his troops to be relieving Ladysmith. In many of the contemporary histories and commentaries of the Natal campaign, this plan is never mentioned, and if anything, the bold move suggests that Buller, albeit much older than when he last commanded in the field, was still thinking laterally and in many phases ahead regarding his overall strategy.
Addison was well aware that, despite an agreement with the Boers to keep Zululand neutral during the war, the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek Commandos had in fact patrolled into Zululand on several known occasions. In order to maintain the element of surprise preceding his attack on Helpmekaar, Addison was forced to approach Helpmekaar from the north via Zululand.
This did not please the Chief Commissioner and Resident Magistrate of Zululand, Sir. Charles James Renault Saunders, who was strongly opposed to any British troops entering Zululand at all. Saunders wished to maintain Zululand as a passive region throughout the war, yet he also realized that his optimistic hopes were greatly unrealistic. The opposing ZAR Commandos were commanded by Vecht Generaal Coenraad Meyer, whose operating base was located in Vryheid. From Vryheid, he commanded the six hundred strong Commando, which had entered Zululand under Vecht Generaal Joachim Johannes Ferreira. Thus, both Briton and Boer did not welcome Addison during his Zululand incursion, however, difficulties had only just begun.
When Addison assumed command of the regiment, he found it badly equipped and poorly horsed for such an operation. He also discovered that the regiment was lacking in military discipline, which it was; however, as the regiment was recruited and deployed in two weeks, this was always going to be an issue. Arguably, in reality, this was not a requirement or priority for the regiment since it was only intended to operate as ground scouts at troop and squadron levels. They triumphed at veldt craft, yet always remained wanting when it came to squadron and regimental drill. Regardless of this issue, Addison had to come to terms with his mission and make it work.
On 5th January, Addison managed to secure Captain George Osborne as the adjutant for the regiment. Addison had first met and served with Osborne in Bethune’s Mounted Infantry during the initial relief of Ladysmith operations, which resulted in a reverse. Not a Natalian, but an Australian, at twenty-seven years of age, Captain George Osborne had already packed a great deal of adventure into his life. The son of a wealthy New South Wales sheep farmer, he had served with the New South Wales Mounted Rifles for three years, attaining the rank of captain and an independent squadron command by January 1897. He resigned his commission in January of the following year and departed the colony under a cloud, according to family legend.
By 5th March, 1898, he had attested with the Natal Mounted Police but applied for his discharge five days later and left the colony for the United States of America. At the time when Theodore ‘Teddy’ Roosevelt was recruiting for his 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry, which later became better known as Teddy’s Rough Riders, Osborne enlisted as a trooper in Troop ‘A’. In Cuba, he fought at Guasimas on 24th June 1898 and again at San Juan Hill on 1 July, before being evacuated with fever. Roosevelt himself cited Osborne as being an excellent man and noted his desire to take his discharge so he could fight the Transvaal Boers.
Osborne had briefly appeared back in Sydney when recruiting was imminent for the Boer War, and he recorded his name for a position in any capacity. Impatiently, he once again cleared out and made his own way to Natal, where he joined ‘A’ Squadron, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, as a lieutenant on 23rd October 1899. A journalist was to write that the authorities were pleased to obtain his services.
At the same time that Osborne was appointed adjutant, Addison appointed as his Regimental Sergeant Major, Henry Davenport Williamson, a 25-year-old Liverpool-born contractor of Currie Road, Durban. Williamson had joined the Natal Police in 1895 and had been serving in the Colonial Scouts as the Squadron Sergeant Major of ‘A’ Squadron since the earliest days of the regiment. In the years to follow, Williamson was destined to return to England again, then move onto Canada, and finally settle in New Zealand. During the Great War, he served on the Western Front with the Canadian Mounted Rifles.
Having obtained six-days of rations and twenty suitable pack horses, Addison's force, now known as Addison's Flying Column, marched out from the Lower Thukela on 14th January, a day late, with a total of 334 all ranks, including 321 Colonial Scouts. In support was a Natal Police Maxim Gun detachment under the command of an excellent policeman, Lance Sergeant John Hodder Furlong, while Lieutenant David McIlleron of the Natal Royal Rifles commanded the signals section of the King’s Royal Rifle Corps that would become Addison’s link with the outside world during the operations. Hodder had already been commended for his services at the outbreak of the war, while McIlleron was an experienced telegraphist and, at the outbreak of the war, was in England attending a British Army Telegraph and Signals course. A total of 561 horses were required and obtained for the mission; however, the poor saddlery could not be replaced and would cause Addison many problems in the future.
To enable time to be made up, it was decided to abandon all wheeled transport that was to be detained at Fort Nongqai in Eshowe, while the Flying Column, as it was to be known, would make a determined forced march for Helpmekaar. Each man carried only what he could, thus reducing rations, which in turn meant that the column would have to rely on living off the land to a large degree. On 14th January, the Flying Column briefly assembled at Fort Yolland on the Eshowe - Nkandla Road, before beginning what would prove to be an arduous trek into Zululand.
Zululand showing the terrain that the Colonial Scouts navigated through (Late Midge Carter collection)
Moving through the winding Insuzi Valley past the deserted Ntingwe Trading Store, in rain and mist, the column climbed up the rugged approach to the heights above the Mangeni River that was reached on the 17th. The scouts were still running behind time and were not even sure if they were at Mangeni at all! The foul weather was the reason for the delay, and the ever-constant shroud of mist hampered their visibility. Torrential rain had now set in and was so heavy that the column was brought to a standstill at Mangeni; they had covered an approximate 75 miles since leaving Eshowe three days earlier. While in the vicinity of Mangeni, the column came upon some Zulus who thought the column to be Boer raiders who were searching for livestock. The Zulus confirmed the Boers presence in the immediate district and sold mealies to the ragged-looking force. Head Leader Harry Woon was later to record:
‘After a couple of days marching, we got into very rough country; heavy rains set in accompanied by mist, which made it impossible to see a hundred yards in any direction. It was a very trying time both for men and horses. We were soaked through; we had no food; the rain formed pools of water where we were standing, and it was impossible to lie down, as there was no shelter of any description where we halted. Colonel Addison managed to get some natives to sell us mealies, and we subsisted during the deluge on these alone, sharing with our horses. I don’t think anybody knew what part of the country we were in, and the fact of the natives having taken us for Boers, and not being surprised at our appearance, was proof enough that we had arrived on the Boers hunting-ground for supplies.’
On 18th January, local Zulus confirmed their position at Mangeni. It was in these same ominous surroundings, 21 years earlier, in January 1879, that Major John Dartnell, a close friend of Addison's, encountered what was thought to be the main Zulu Army, which in turn was a contributing factor that led to the British defeat at iSandlwana—a battle that was only too well known to Addison’s Natalian’s.
Addison’s column, cold, completely wet through, and ravenously hungry, idled down from the heights and approached the store at iSandlwana, where the Scottish proprietor baked hundreds of loaves of bread to feed the tired and wet regiment as they attempted to dry their uniforms. While at iSandlwana, Addison learned that the Boers were still occupying Rorke’s Drift and Helpmekaar, and instead of proceeding enroute to Helpmekaar, he detoured north, for reasons unknown to the rank and file at the time. With no time to lose, the Flying Column rode across the old iSandlwana battlefield, past the massed graves and cairns of the 24th Foot, and headed in a northerly direction towards the Nqutu Ranges. Puzzled by Addison’s manoeuvre, the now revitalized regiment ascended the ranges and arrived at the Nqutu Magistracy to face an unwelcome reception.
Upon their arrival at the Nqutu Magistracy, the 33-year-old Magistrate, Charles Francis Hignett, reluctantly received Addison’s regiment. The cold reception was not due to poor hospitality but rather to frustration and anxiety on the part of Hignett. He had been trying, in difficult circumstances, since the outbreak of the war, to keep the district passive, and he felt that the presence of the Colonial Scouts would break this peace. After all, Hignett at Nqutu was extremely exposed and constantly surrounded by Boers. In October 1899, Hignett had in his district the acting Deputy Commissioner of Mines for Zululand, Mr. Albert John Nettle, who had collected as many wagons as possible from the Nqutu district and handed them over to the military at Pietermaritzburg, Natal. Commandeering was never really accepted, and while the British had taken what they required, naturally there was a fear that the Boers would do the same.
The iSandlwana Battlefield with the burial cairns being visible. Although, not the Colonial Scouts, this image of Colonel Pulteney's column in September 1901 shows what the old battlefield looked like during the war. (Pictorial History of the 1st Battalion, Scots Guards)
As early as 30th November 1899, Hignett had discussed with the local Zulu inDuna’s the situation, in which they stated that they would protect the magistracy in the event of a Boer incursion into the district. On at least three separate occasions, they stood true to their word and did so. The first occasion, on 13th December, was in response to the rumor of a Boer incursion, for which the well-known and celebrated inDuna Mehlokazulu, the Chief of the Ngobese, mustered at the magistracy a 250-strong impi. Not long after, the Boers raided and looted both the Vant’s Drift and Rorke’s Drift Trading Stores, but appeared to have not touched the store at iSandlwana. When the Boers raided Rorke’s Drift inDuna Tlokoa, not only mustered an impi but went out in search of the raiders, who soon fled the Nqutu District. Co-located with Hignett at Nqutu were some 8 civilians, 9 Natal Police, and 50 Zululand Police.
The Nqutu Magistracy where Colonel Addison and Magistrate Hignett met and argued the presence of the Colonial Scouts in Zululand (Talana Museum)
Hignett was himself a former officer of both the 1st Battalion, North Staffordshire Regiment (1883–89) and a sub-inspector of the Zululand Mounted Police with operational experience during the Zululand disturbances of 1888. He had settled in Natal and Zululand, holding several positions with the Natal Civil Service, and had married the daughter of Sir. Melmoth Osborne KCMG, a veteran Natal Civil Servant of great note and prestige.
Hignett fed Addison’s regiment, and the following day, he ordered them away from the magistracy, as he believed the Boers were about to attack his isolated and vulnerable post. Hignett was right; the Boers were located at Vant’s Drift, Babanango (350 strong), Helpmekaar (400 strong), Rorke’s Drift, and Nondweni (100 strong). This intelligence was obtained from his own network of Native Scouts, who were often referred to as Hignett’s Scouts, and provided him with both accurate and timely information. Hignett had often been regarded by some as being pro-Boer, the ever-critical Head Leader Woon included, who wrote of their time at Nqutu as follows:
‘We found that we were on the battlefield of Isandlwana, where the 24th Regiment had been massacred during the Zulu war of 1879. The graves were still visible. We were told that the Boers had returned in the direction of Rorke’s Drift to Helpmekaar, and that they had not interfered with the store in any way. Colonel A------- [Addison] seemed anxious to get out of the neighborhood, for some reason, and the regiment marched onto Nqutu, a small magistracy on the borders of Zululand and Natal, where we found a small detachment of Natal Police, with the Magistrate and two stores, in one of which I recognized the owner as an old Umtata man whom I had known well a few years before. He was very pleased to see me and took me to his house, where I was entertained at dinner, and spent a pleasant hour chatting over old times. The Magistrate did not seem to welcome the visit of Colonel A------ and his men in the spirit he should have done, and complained that the Boers, who had hitherto left them alone, might now come back and attack the place. He asked Colonel A------ to withdraw, and the regiment was marched to a camping-ground about two miles distant from the magistracy, where we remained while patrols were sent out, and information as to the Boer movements was being collected from natives, with whom Colonel A------ seemed to have a perfect understanding.’
Addison’s men had arrived at Nqutu after five continuous days in the saddle, from daylight to dusk. They had experienced the cold, torrential rains, and then blistering heat with little rest and were forced to survive on meager rations or none at all. They had also arrived at Nqutu with 60 dismounted men whose horses had been lost during the ride, chiefly through saddle problems. Addison had received no news of Buller’s advance on Ladysmith due to the signals section not being able to establish telegraphic contact in the bad weather.
The Boers were not just at Helpmekaar, which was Addison’s objective, but were to the north, south, west, and east of him; they knew his location also. With the previous failures on the Thukela in mind, compounded by the fact that he was surrounded, Addison assessed his predicament with caution. Hignett’s obstructive attitude also added a degree of additional tension to the situation.
It was during the afternoon of 19th January, while the weather had cleared and Addison’s column rested in situ near the Nqutu Magistracy, that excited Zulu spies arrived in the camp. The spies, most probably Hignett’s Scouts, advised Addison that a large Boer force of around 1,000 Burghers, along with heavy guns, were approaching the direction of Nqutu. Head Leader Woon recorded that Addison became very excited and shouted for the horses to be brought in and the men to saddle up: ‘He mounted, and taking with him the men who were ready, rode off, telling me to follow as soon as possible with the remainder’.
Addison immediately took what men were ready and began cantering back past iSandlwana and along the Eshowe Road before his regiment was fully mustered together. No man was allowed to talk or smoke during the retirement. Splitting his force in the face of the enemy, whose dispositions were unknown, was a tactical blunder that could have proven disastrous. While he led the scattered force out of the Nqutu Ranges, Head Leader Woon, remaining back at the abandoned camp, struggled to bring in the vedettes, who were diligently manning the outlining posts that were located miles away and in every direction.
While on the move, Addison decided that he would make for Madhlozi Hill, from where they would attempt to make contact with Buller with a heliograph and await supplies from Eshowe. Woon described the disorganized and hasty withdrawal from the camp as follows:
‘The Maxim gun, which had been attached to the Scouts on the expedition, and which was manned by a sergeant and privates of the Natal Police, was trotting after the others [Addison], I stopped it and told the sergeant the state of affairs, and ordered him to remain with my squadron till the others had saddled up and followed the colonel. On making inquiries, I found that the other squadrons had gone off, leaving the men who had been posted as vedettes still out on the veldt, and in ignorance of the move which had been made; I sent men out to call them in, and by the time they were all collected it was dark and commencing to rain. I then marched off with my squadron and the Maxim gun along the road the rest of the regiment had taken…..I sent on a sergeant with a message to the colonel, telling him that I had been delayed getting in the vedettes, that the Maxim gun horses were getting somewhat knocked up, and that I could not go much farther; I asked for instructions, and halted my squadron on the banks of a small stream to await the reply. The sergeant returned about midnight, and confirmed my suspicions that we were simply bolting from the Boers. He informed me that the rest of the regiment were halted on the road leading down from the high plateau we were on to the low country in the direction of Eshowe – that the men were stretched all along the road, sitting down in the rain, holding their horses, which remained saddled, and having guessed what was the matter, were grumbling and swearing at the manner in which they were being treated. They were about five miles distant, and the colonel had given orders for me to come on as soon as possible…At daybreak, as soon as the surrounding country became visible, I moved on with the men and Maxims….The Colonel with the rest of the men had continued their retiring move to the Nkandhla forest, where we finally overtook them. No explanations were given except that the wagons with provisions and grain were on the way from Eshowe to meet us.’
Head Leader Harry V. Woon who was critical of Addison's actions in Zululand. Woon had served with the Cape Mounted Rifles during the Moorosi Rebellion 1879, BaSotho Gun War 1880-81, Matabele War 1893 and in Bechuanaland 1896/97 (Twenty-Five Years Soldiering in South Africa)
An unknown Colonial Scout wrote of his experiences during the withdrawal from the Nqutu district in a letter to the Natal Mercury:
‘The following afternoon [19th January], the magistrate, Mr. Hignett, ordered Col Addison to retire with all speed before an enemy of 1,000 (Actually 600), marching on us with big guns. The retirement began at sunset although all were eager to stay and fight and protect the Magistracy. That first backward night march, the precursor of many, remains engraved on the memory as an oppressive nightmare. It lasted from 6.pm. till 4.am. About 10 the column was halted at a wayside store, and each man served out with 7lb of horse mealies, for our own consumption! For several days we had to subsist on horse diet. The next three days were days of misery; without shelter, without proper food, without wood to make fires, we were exposed for half a week to storms of rain and artic winds. Encamped on a bleak rocky hill, the elements mocked and made sport of us. But we manfully bore our trials and tribulations, and only indulged in a grumble!’
Madhlozi Hill was the hill described by the unknown scout. Arriving at Madhlozi on the 20th, Addison now concentrated his column on the hill. Here he purchased from the natives a wagonload of mealies, which would feed the regiment for three days. Luckily, when the three days’ worth of mealies ran out on the 23rd, the weather-beaten regiment welcomed two wagonloads of supplies from Eshowe under Quartermaster Cecil Holliday. With some six days’ worth of biscuits, coffee, and sugar, Addison took to the field yet again to attempt to gain heliographic communication with Buller in order to ascertain if he was still required to drive the Boers from Helpmekaar. While upon Madhlozi, Addison’s signalers failed in their vain attempts to establish communications with the outside world—had Buller succeeded?
Addison led the flying column to Malakatha Mountain, just south of iSandlwana and only a stone’s throw from the uMzinyathi (Buffalo) River. From here, Addison was able to watch the Helpmekaar District and attempt to re-establish communications. His signalers of the KRRC, at the highest point of Malakatha, still had no news of Buller’s progress, yet the battle for the Thukela Heights was well under way and only hours from failure. His scouts reported and saw the Boers still occupying Helpmekaar, but with no news of Buller’s progress, his orders to seize Helpmekaar would prove disastrous if carried out. He remained at Malakatha until his rations were yet again exhausted, forcing his hand once more to move on.
Trooper ‘Fred’ Trethowan wrote home to his family in Australia, providing an insight into the activities of ‘E’ Squadron during their service in Zululand:
‘We were recalled from Mooi River and came by train right down to Durban, and left the same day for North Eastern Zululand. We trained to the Tugela, then crossed under a forced march on a pontoon. In scouting at times, we have it exceptionally hard. Ordinary rations are 1lb beef and three biscuits per day. Very often we have to buy mealies (Indian corn) and eat that. Then for days we are without our tents and only the broad canopy of the sky above to cover us. I am told that our march here is a record one, but it came very hard on the horses. We had to leave several on the road behind us. We can see the Boers at Helpmekaar, and I’m awfully anxious to have a cut at them. Things in general are going well. Everything is changing for the better, even the South African share market is beginning to revive. I am in the best of spirits.’
On 29th January, Addison received news from Eshowe that the Boer Commando that had been operating around the Babanango ranges had been reinforced with a view to taking on the Flying Column in the Mangeni region. Addison, with no food and still without any definite news of Buller’s progress, responded immediately by withdrawing his column back to the heights of the Madhlozi mountain. On the 31st, a Natal policeman and a civilian arrived in camp, informing Addison that the Nqutu Magistracy had been captured by the Boers that very morning. Zulu runners from Nqutu confirmed the story soon after. In addition to these reports, Addison was ordered to retire to Eshowe. He entered Eshowe on 2nd February to learn the full story of Buller’s defeat at Spion Kop. The Helpmekaar sortie was aborted. Harry Woon recorded, years later, the news received that day:
‘Our informants had ridden off when they heard the Magistrate give the order that there was to be no resistance to the Boers’ occupation, an order which confirmed the suspicions that had already been aroused as to the Magistrate (Hignett) being a pro-Boer.’
The Boer Commando that had caused Hignett to remove Addison from Nqutu with considerable speed had followed up the Colonial Scouts’ chaotic bolt on the 19th for some distance in order to observe their movement. It was only when the scouts departed the high country that they calculated that Addison’s force was no real threat to their own operations in Zululand. They took the Nqutu Magistracy without a fight and, in time, probed forward towards the Nkandhla Magistracy to repeat their Nqutu success. For the time being, they dominated Zululand, while Addison’s Flying Column became part of the Eshowe garrison, having ridden around Zululand like a ricocheting bullet. Hignett and his men were sent as prisoners to Pretoria; however, when Paul Kruger learned about this, he had the Zulus repatriated back to Natal. There was later an investigation into the manner in which the Nqutu Magistracy was surrendered to the Boers, and Hignett sued for damages against the Nqutu storekeeper, Mr. Strachan, who claimed that Hignett had been guilty of cowardice and treachery. Hignett received £300 in damages.
References:
Ballarat Courier 5 March 1900
Charles Smythe., Daphane Child
Globe., 12 December 1901
Natal Volunteer Record – Robertson & Coy Durban 1900
Zululand and the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). Military History Journal, June 1989
The Rough Riders – T. Roosevelt New York 1902
Twenty-Five Years Soldiering in South Africa – A Colonial Officer (H.V. Woon) London 1909
That makes my hardest day seem like a dream Cam.